The Unsettled Legacy of the Cold War by Steinbruner, John & Lewis, Jeffrey
On May 24, 2002, at a summit meeting
in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir
Putin and U.S. President George W.
Bush signed a treaty and issued a decla-
ration of political accommodation
promising, in Bush’s words, to “liqui-
date the legacy of the Cold War.” That is,
of course, an appealing phrase and an
aspiration every reasonable person will
endorse. But it is certainly not an immi-
nent accomplishment–not yet even the
predominant trend. 
The underlying reality is that U.S. mil-
itary forces are being prepared for ex-
tended confrontation, not political ac-
commodation. Their projected capabili-
ties are inherently provocative not only
to Russia, but to China as well. They are
also vulnerable to Russian and Chinese
reactions, particularly in space, where
some of the most critical assets are
based. Soothing rhetoric cannot inde½-
nitely obscure the ominous implications.
It is time for everyone to pay attention. 
The treaty negotiated in Moscow lim-
its the number of strategic nuclear war-
heads that are to be operationally de-
ployed by their respective military estab-
lishments on December 31, 2012– on
which day the treaty expires. At ½rst
glance, that appears to establish the
principle of legal restraint for both nu-
clear forces. But the treaty sets no signi½-
cant limit on destructive capabilities.
The imposed ceiling of 2,200 operation-
ally deployed nuclear warheads permits
the United States, for instance, a suf½-
cient number of immediately available
nuclear weapons to destroy much of the
Russian nuclear arsenal in a ½rst strike–
and to simultaneously devastate Russia’s
conventional forces, political leadership,
and industrial base. Moreover, the treaty
covers only those weapons that are pres-
ent at the operational bases of intercon-
tinental range forces, allowing both sig-
natories to retain ‘reserve’ inventories
greatly in excess of the 2,200 warhead
ceiling. Reserve warheads could be ‘up-
loaded’ onto delivery vehicles and re-
turned to immediately available status in
a short period of time.
So, for the foreseeable future, both na-
tions will retain nuclear weapons far in
excess of the number needed for any
conceivable purpose–and there are no
supplementary restraints. As a result,
compliance with the treaty will not
meaningfully diminish the lethal poten-
tial of either nation’s nuclear force. Nor
will the treaty establish an equitable or
stable strategic balance, since Russia
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does not have the resources to safely
maintain its nuclear forces at the size
and alert rates envisaged by the United
States. Over time, a deteriorating
Russian arsenal will become increasingly
vulnerable to preemptive attack, particu-
larly as the United States undertakes
planned modernization of nuclear forces
and the deployment of missile defenses.
If this agreement were seriously ex-
pected to carry any burden whatsoever,
it would not pass even the most rudi-
mentary scrutiny. Despite its glaring in-
adequacies, Congress appears poised to
ratify the Moscow Treaty, no questions
asked.
It is tempting, of course, to believe
that the spirit of accommodation rhetor-
ically proclaimed in Moscow might
gradually dissolve the operational con-
frontation of the two nuclear forces that
has prevailed continuously since the
1950s. To achieve that result, all weapons
would have to be consigned to secure
storage; none could be held available for
immediate use; and preparations for
massive, rapidly enacted retaliation
would have to be decisively terminated.
If all that were to occur, managerial con-
trol of each arsenal would be assured at a
much higher standard than currently
prevails, and the practical signi½cance of
residual disparities between them would
be substantially diminished. That would
come much closer to liquidating danger-
ous legacies.
Unfortunately, the Bush administra-
tion appears to have no interest in alter-
ing either the Cold War con½guration of
the U.S. nuclear arsenal or the Cold War
mindset that underlies it. 
Under the current planning guidance
issued for U.S. nuclear forces, thousands
of nuclear weapons are to be maintained
inde½nitely on continuous alert status.
Those forces will continue to retain the
capacity to devastate any foe on a few-
minutes notice. As at the height of the
Cold War, their massively destructive
½repower will be directed primarily
against Russia and China, even if that
fact is not announced as bluntly as it
once was. Moreover, the American nu-
clear arsenal will be coupled with in-
creasingly capable conventional forces,
able to undertake increasingly intrusive
operations on a global scale. The tradi-
tional emphasis on responding to ag-
gression is being overlaid with a new
stress on initiating attacks against terror-
ist networks and ‘evil’ states suspected
of seeking weapons of mass destruction.
The forces instructed to develop and
preserve this array of capabilities are
supported by a U.S. defense budget larg-
er than the combined defense expendi-
tures of the twenty-½ve countries ranked
next highest in defense spending. 
Theses forces, moreover, are being
directed by increasingly nationalistic se-
curity policies. The Bush administration
has conducted an assault on the major
elements of the multilateral legal frame-
work that had been developed to regu-
late security policies and force deploy-
ments. The United States abrogated the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which
stood for thirty years as a widely ac-
knowledged pillar of restraint. It forced
termination of efforts to negotiate a
compliance protocol for the Biological
Weapons Convention. It has repeatedly
denigrated and refused to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, despite
international consensus on the necessity
of such a ban. Some senior Bush of½cials
have even publicly questioned the nega-
tive security assurances that previous
administrations issued in support of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 
These policies are a sharp departure
from past administrations of both par-
ties, and do not reflect majority senti-
ment as measured in opinion polls. The






American political system has neverthe-
less not responded to this dramatic shift
in policy and approach; for the moment,
the political system appears to be far
more interested in wielding effective
force than in promoting global reassur-
ance.
There is good reason to expect that a
more balanced attitude will eventually
emerge. Globalization, particularly the
attendant process of economic engage-
ment, creates a strong incentive to pur-
sue seriously the political accommoda-
tion declared at the Moscow summit.
The impulse for assertive superiority
emanating from the American military
planning system is not realistic and does
not reflect the broader interests of the
United States. A democratic process
worthy of the name will eventually have
to represent those interests, and in doing
so will have to pursue equitable accom-
modation not just with Russia, but with
China and all of the other major soci-
eties currently outside of our alliance
system. 
There are serious questions, however,
as to how gracefully the necessary ad-
justments might occur. There could be
some painful lessons along the way. 
One implication of the Moscow sum-
mit is that Russia will pursue incremen-
tal accommodation over some period of
time. In the initial stages, that effort will
require Russia to accept both the inequi-
table force balances that will result from
the Moscow treaty and signi½cant insti-
tutional discrimination imposed by the
nato–Russia Council Agreement an-
nounced in Rome shortly after the Mos-
cow summit. That implicit strategy re-
flects an impressively prudent judgment
in the face of what Russian leaders in
earlier times would undoubtedly have
treated as hostile provocation. By toler-
ating some immediate indignity, the
Russians have gained time to try to in-
duce the United States and its allies to be
more forthcoming than they currently
intend. Meanwhile there is no speci½c
situation likely to generate a sudden con-
frontation with the United States, and
the stark disparities in military invest-
ment will not become urgently danger-
ous to Russia for another decade or so.
In the long run, however, if the strate-
gy of incremental accommodation does
not produce solid results, future Russian
leaders are likely to devise a more force-
ful reaction. They cannot advertise that
possibility without undermining the ef-
fort to achieve meaningful accommoda-
tion, but the logic they are likely to use is
already visible in China. 
In recent years, China has pursued
economic accommodation with all the
industrial democracies much more as-
sertively and effectively than has Russia.
That effort was consolidated with Chi-
na’s entry into the World Trade Organi-
zation. China’s attempts to establish
corresponding security arrangements
have not been successful, however.
There are no treaties regulating its secu-
rity relationship with the United States,
and China considers the most relevant
political document–a 1982 communiqué
intended to limit arms sales to Taiwan–
to have been violated by the United
States. Many Chinese of½cials view U.S.
military planning projections with grow-
ing alarm and have concluded that China
is now the principal target for the ad-
vanced capabilities the United States is
developing. These of½cials worry that
the U.S. ballistic missile defense pro-
gram is a direct threat to the minimal
nuclear deterrent force that China has
chosen to maintain. 
Unlike the Russians, who have the
option of playing for time, the Chinese
are confronted with the prospect of
near-term confrontation over the status
of Taiwan–a reasonable assessment in
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light of the identi½cation of a conflict
over Taiwan as one of a handful of ‘im-
mediate contingencies’ in the U.S. Nucle-
ar Posture Review. The Chinese are espe-
cially concerned that increasingly so-
phisticated American capabilities for
preemptive attack might be used to sup-
port Taiwanese independence.
Although it is common in the United
States to depict China as a rising power
bent on regional domination, the securi-
ty assessments provided by Chinese
leaders are much more circumspect.
Their central planning documents iden-
tify internal economic development as
the overriding national priority, and
frankly admit the constraint this impos-
es on military development. After allow-
ing defense expenditures to decline for
the ½rst ½fteen years of its economic re-
form program, China began to increase
its defense effort in the 1990s. Still, Chi-
na’s military investment remains sub-
stantially below that of the United
States, certainly in absolute amount and
probably as a percentage of overall de-
fense spending as well. 
The maintenance of a large U.S. nucle-
ar arsenal, coupled with advanced space
systems including missile defenses, cre-
ates concern in Beijing about the surviv-
ability of the Chinese nuclear deterrent.
In the necessarily pessimistic assessment
of the weaker party, China’s leaders are
compelled to consider whether the de-
ployment of missile defense systems
might allow the much stronger United
States, perhaps during a crisis over Tai-
wan, to become con½dent that it could
conduct a disarming ½rst strike against
China’s two-dozen or so intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles (icbms). The Chi-
nese worry that the United States might
believe that missile defenses would be
able to intercept in flight any Chinese
missiles that were not destroyed on the
ground. The United States could also use
space-based surveillance, reconnais-
sance, and precision strike assets to ½nd
and destroy the mobile icbms that Chi-
na hopes to deploy in the next eight to
ten years, in order to increase the surviv-
ability of its deterrent.
The Chinese were particularly alarmed
by a 1998 long-range planning document
released by the then United States Space
Command (usspacecom). That docu-
ment outlined a concept called global en-
gagement–a combination of global sur-
veillance, missile defense, and space-
based strike capabilities that would en-
able the United States to undertake ef-
fective preemption anywhere in the
world and would deny similar capability
to any other country. 
usspacecom was frank about the
controversial nature of such a proposal.
“At present,” the authors wrote, “the
notion of weapons in space is not consis-
tent with U.S. national policy. Planning
for the possibility [of weapons in space]
is a purpose of this plan should our civil-
ian leadership decide that the applica-
tion of force from space is in our nation-
al interest.”
Most recently, prominent civilian
of½cials have endorsed the change of
policy that would be required to pursue
the usspacecom vision. The congres-
sionally mandated Commission to As-
sess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization
warned of a “Pearl Harbor in space” un-
less the United States developed the ca-
pability to “project power in, through,
and from space.” Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, who chaired the
Commission before his nomination,
identi½ed outer space as one of a small
number of key goals for defense trans-
formation and implemented many of the
organizational recommendations con-
tained in the Space Commission report.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of






Staff, Air Force General Richard Myers,
is the former Commander in Chief of
usspacecom and a strong proponent
of global engagement. Under Rumsfeld
and Myers, the Defense Department has
imposed changes in doctrine, organiza-
tion, and budgets in support of a global
engagement capability. The Department
drafted a new Nuclear Posture Review,
which reportedly advocates the use of
space-based assets to enhance conven-
tional and nuclear strike missions; com-
bined usspacecom with United States
Strategic Command, which maintains
operational control of U.S. nuclear
forces, to create a single entity responsi-
ble for early warning, missile defense,
and long-range strikes; and requested
$1.6 billion over ½scal years 2003–2007
to develop space-based lasers and kinetic
kill vehicles to intercept satellites and
ballistic missiles.
As a practical matter, China has no real
hope of matching the military capabili-
ties currently being developed by the
United States. China’s leaders clearly
understand that fact–but they have no
intention of submitting to intimidation,
either. 
They are therefore exploring the feasi-
bility of what U.S. of½cials term an
‘asymmetric’ military response. They
have identi½ed U.S. assets in space as the
prime target for such a response. Space
assets are exceedingly valuable–and
exceedingly vulnerable. They can be suc-
cessfully attacked at a small fraction of
the cost and effort required to develop,
protect, or replace them. Acts of inter-
ference or direct destruction would en-
tail no immediate human casualties but
could be monumentally disruptive to
military and commercial support servic-
es. The mere prospect of discreet ‘asym-
metric’ acts of that sort can be expected
to induce a more inclusive and more
penetrating discussion of national inter-
ests within the American political sys-
tem. If Chinese leaders are skillful
enough to present that possibility as a
legitimate reaction to provocation, they
could expect to attract very substantial
support from an international commu-
nity increasingly interested in commer-
cial space activities. 
There is some risk, of course; an asym-
metric strategy of this sort might back-
½re in the United States. Advocates of
expanding U.S. military activities in out-
er space might successfully use threats of
interference to con½rm the aggressive
intentions they have been projecting to
justify their efforts. In that event, China
would have to develop suf½cient capaci-
ty for interference–against dedicated
resistance–to discourage U.S. preemp-
tive operations. The feasibility of that
project remains to be demonstrated, but
it is certainly a plausible aspiration. 
The earliest stages of a confrontation
between the United States and China are
already occurring at the United Nations
Conference on Disarmament (cd) in
Geneva. That is a forum that does not at-
tract general public attention or directly
affect the main channels of diplomacy. It
therefore provides a means of issuing of-
½cial warnings that can readily be re-
tracted. 
In recent years, the Chinese delegate
to the cd has repeatedly stated that the
plans for the military use of outer space
projected by usspacecom are not con-
sistent with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
The preamble of this treaty provides le-
gal protection for existing space assets,
provided that they are peaceful in char-
acter. The introduction of weapons for
offensive purposes would violate that
provision, China’s delegates have con-
tended, and would therefore remove le-
gal protection for any asset that could
contribute to military operations, a for-
mulation that potentially includes com-
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mercial assets as well. Denial of legal
protection is the ½rst step in a strategy of
legitimized interference. 
China’s delegates have also repeatedly
asked for a formal mandate for the cd to
negotiate a supplemental treaty, speci½-
cally to prohibit the placement of weap-
ons in space, and to de½ne more explicit-
ly the acceptable terms of military sup-
port activities. Such a display of benign
intent would be the second step in a
Chinese strategy to win international
support. The U.S. delegate has helped to
validate both steps by repeatedly reject-
ing any effort to negotiate a new treaty. 
This dispute has deadlocked the cd,
which operates on the basis of consen-
sus, leaving it without a plan of work
since 1998. The intransigence displayed
by the United States appears to be alien-
ating many allies who worry about the
impact of U.S. missile defense deploy-
ments on international stability. 
Just days after the Moscow summit,
the Russian delegate joined his Chinese
counterpart in presenting a draft work-
ing paper that outlined tentative sugges-
tions on a treaty to prohibit the place-
ment of weapons and use of force in
outer space. The coincidence of timing
was undoubtedly not an accident, as the
Russians are fond of saying. 
The development of rules to regulate
activity in space in the emerging global
security situation is admittedly a com-
plex matter. There are reasonable dis-
agreements about how best to proceed.
It should be obvious, however, that equi-
table accommodation is overwhelmingly
in the general interest and that the incip-
ient confrontation now in its earliest
stages is a preventable calamity. If there
is to be a reasonable outcome, then the
most insidious of the Cold War lega-
cies–the apparent commitment of the
United States to active military confron-
tation for decisive national advantage–
will have to be adjusted in reality, not
merely in words. 
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